The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence has been used intensively to deal with uncer tainty in knowledge-based systems. How ever the representation of uncertain rela tionships between evidence and hypothesis groups (heuristic knowledge) is still a major research problem. This paper presents an ap proach to representing such heuristic knowl edge by evidential mappings which are de fi ned on the basis of mass functions. The re lationships between evidential mappings and multivalued mappings, as well as between ev idential mappings and Bayesian multi-val ued causal link models in Bayesian theory are discussed. Following this the detailed pro cedures for constructing evidential mappings for any set of heuristic rules are introduced. Several situations of belief propagation are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In the design and implementation of expert systems and decision making systems, the problem of uncertain knowledge and evidence has to be solved. Several ap proaches can be used to deal with this problem, such as Mycin's certainty factors, Prospector's inference nets, fuzzy sets, Bayesian nets and Dempster-Shafer's belief functions. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of problem involving uncertainty: one is caused by uncer tain evidence; another is caused by uncertain knowl edge, i.e. heuristic knowledge. The former is a re sult of ill-defined concepts in the observation, or due to inaccuracy and poor reliability of the instruments used to make the observations. The latter is a. result of weak implication which occurs when the expert or model builder is unable to establish a strong correla tion between premise (or evidence) and conclusion (or hypotheses) (Bonissone and Tong 1985) .
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence provides a flexible approach to representing uncertain evidence. This theory, which is claimed as an generalization of Bayesian inference (Shafer 1976 (Shafer , 1981 , has the advan tages of representing ignorance of evidence and nar rowing the hypothesis space as a result of evidence accumulation. Several AI implementations have been undertaken (Laskey et al 1989 , Lowrance et al 1986 , Strat 1987 , Wesley 1988 , Yen 1989 , Zarley et al 1988 based on the theory or extended versions of the theory (Laskey and Lehner 1989; Yen 1989) . In this paper we argue that it is difficult to represent uncertain heuris tic knowledge in this theory; however in most complex domains, heuristic knowledge plays an important role in solving problems.
Consider the following piece of heuristic knowledge: if X is X1, then Y is Y1 with a degree of belief r1. If we get a piece of evidence which says that X is X1 with a degree of a1, by invoking this rule we should be able to obtain the corresponding degree y1 for Y is Y1. Certainly the value of Yl must be a function F of a1 and r1 (i.e. y1 = F(a1, r1)). More generally, we suppose that a set of heuristic rules R includes:
R1: if E1 then H11 with a degree of belief ru; H12 with a degree of belief r12i R2: if E2 then H21 with a degree of belief r2 1i H22 with a degree of belief r22i
( 1) where E1, E2, .•• ,En are values (or propositions) of the variable E, and E, is called an antecedent of rule .Rt. A H&i in rule� is a subset of the values (or propositions) of the variable H and it is called one of the conclusions of rule �-A r;,-is called a rule strength.
Assume we have a piece of evidence which says that E1 is confirmed with a1, E2 is confirmed with a2, ••. , En is confirmed with an, how can we solve the following problems:
of belief on H1;) from those � and r1;?
• if more than one set of rules is invoked and the same conclusion H1; is obtained, what will be the final degree of belief on Ha; from those h0;, ••• , h�o1?
Generally, if the variable E is a Cartesian product of variables A, B, ... , C, that is each E, is in a form of (A, andB i and ... andCk), assuming we know the evidence for A, B, ... , C, then
• what is the function F' to determine the degree of belief on the premise (A; andBi and ... andC,.)?
These problems have been modelled in fuzzy the ory using a fuzzy extension of modal logic, based on Zadeh's concepts of necessity and possibility (Prade 1981) . They were also solved in Mycin's certainty fac tor model {Shortliffe and Buchanan 1976). Can these problems be solved in Dempster-Shafer theory? In this paper we analyze these problems and propose our approaches for solving them by extending the the ory of evidence. The paper is organized as follows.
In section 2 the basics of Dempster-Shafer theory are introduced and the approach for representing heuris tic knowledge by evidential mappings is described in which a matrix is used to represent the uncertain rela tionships between evidence and conclusions. In section 3 the relations between Bayesian inference and evi dential mappings are examined in which it is proved that the multi-valued causal links between hypotheses space Ha nd evidence space E (Pearl 1988) in Bayesian thec,ry is consistent with the special case of evidential mappings. In section 4 the method of constructing a complete evidential mapping matrix for an evidential mapping of a heuristic rule is discussed. In section 5
belief propagation approaches are discussed for differ ent situations. Finally a conclusion is given along with some consideration of related work.
2

REPRESENTING HEURISTIC KNOWLEDGE IN D-S THEORY
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (which is also called the theory of belief functions (Smets 1988 provides an alternative approach to drawing plausible conclusions from uncertain and in complete evidence. It is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability, it is more flexible, and it allows us to derive degrees of belief for a question from probabilities of a related question.
2.1
THE BASICS OF D-S THEORY
Suppose e is a fi nite set, which consists of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions of a problem or all values of a variable, 2 8 is the set of all subsets of e. A function Bel: 2 8 ----+[0, 1] is called a belief function in Shafer {1976}, if it satisfi es the following conditions:
2. Bel(e) = 1; A belief function {or a mass function) on a frame e can either be directly obtained from a piece of evi dence or calculated from a probability measure P on the related frame T by a mu.ltiva l u.ed mapping r be tween T and e (Dempster 1967) , that is a multivalued mapping r assigns each element tofT to a subset A of e. The impact of several belief functions (or mass functions) on the same frame of discernment is ob tained by using Dempster's rule of combination which treats Bayesian conditioning probabilities as a special case (Shafer 1976 
This rule requires that the combined belief functions (or their mass functions) are independent. This condi tion has been further enhanced as DS-independent in Voorbraak (1991).
2.2
REPRESENTING HEURISTIC KNOWLEDGE IN D-S THEORY
It is obvious that a heuristic rule like {if X is X1 then Y is Y1 with a degree of belief r1 } cannot be directly represented in D-S theory. Some work concerning this topic was carried out previously (Ginsberg 1984 , Yen 1988 , Liu 1986 , Hau and Kashyap 1990 . We pro pose that evidential mappings which are defi ned on the basis of mass functions can be used to represent the uncertain relationships between evidence and con clusions.
Definition 1 An e'l.lidential mapping is the mapping from one frame of discernment to another, which rep resents causal link! among elements of two frames of discernment in the form of mass functions. Fo rmally an evidential mapping from frame 9E to frame aH is I . r · a 2 eH><fD,l) Th . The corresponding matrix of this evidential mapping is:
The size of matrix M is n X l where n is the number of elements in eE and l equals I28NI-1 (except 0 is a mass function on 9 E X 9 H, with its focal elements An evidential mapping from e E to e H states that for two related questions represented by 9 E and 9 H, if the truth for the question represented by 9 E is e0 then the truth for the question represented by 9H is in a set a,' but e, has different inter relationships with dif ferent subsets of e,. The f(e, -H;;) is used to reflect the sensitivity or strength of interrelation between e, and H,,-. Certainly the total strength should be 1.
Example 1: H an evidential mapping r • specifies mapping from an evidence space a E to a hypothesis space 6H as:
and a related set of heuristic rules is R:
e 3---+ {a4, as} (0.9);
where 9E = { el, e 2, e3} and aH = { a l, a21 a s, a 4, as}, then the matrix M has 2s -1 columns, most of which have only zero m,: i such as columns {a l}, { a1, a2, a 3 } . Obviously, multivalued mappings in section 2.1 and Bayesian multi-valued causal link models (Pearl 1988} can all be represented using such evidential mappings.
Corollary 1 If all the m;3 in a basic matrix BM of an e'l.lidential mapping from a E to 9 H are either 1 or 0 then the evidential mapping is a multivalued mapping.
For any e,, the mas8 function If a piece of evidence gives a probability distribution P on e E I then a new function m on e H can be calculated by the evidential mapping from 8 E to 8 H:
The function m is a basic probability assignment in the hypothesis space and has the following features: 1) m{0) = 0 and 2) E k m(Hk) = 1 where Hk s; e.
This can be proved by the following according to def inition 1, probability distribution P and features of a mass function.
Corollary 3 A function m is a mass function on frame 8 H if it is given by formula £ und�r the con dition that P is a probability distribution on space 9 E and f* is an evidential mapping from 8 E to 9 n.
The theoretical support of the formula (2) is Bayes' formula P(A) = L P(AIB;.)P(B;.)
• where B, is an element of an exhaustive and mutually exclusive event set (Pearl 1988) .
We suppose that any evidence e giving P(B;./e) has no effect on P(AjB,). This rule is also called Jeffrey's rule of conditioning ( Jeffrey 1965 , Shafer 1981 .
2.3
CREATING EVIDENTIAL MAPPINGS FOR INCOMPLETE HEURISTIC RULE SETS
We have seen in the above section that an evidential mapping can be associated with a set of heuristic rules. The other way around, given a set of heuristic rules in the form of (1), if all the antecedents of rules can form a frame of discernment 9 E, all the conclusions of rules can form another frame of discernment 8 n, and for any heuristic rule R;, the sum of r;.; (for j = 1, .. , m)
is 1, then an evidential mapping can be established between 9s and 9 n. Unfortunately, the antecedents (or conclusions) of a set of rules normally cannot form a. frame of discernment which is mutually exclusive and exhaustive and usually the sum of r1; for rule R; is less than 1. For example if there is only one rule in a set of otherwise define eE =E.
• if H is not a frame of di.scernment then define hrn+l = ..., (hl v ... v h,.. ) and eH = {h,.. +!} u H; otherwise d�fine en =H.
• if t!n+l exi3t.S th�n add the rule Rn+1 : (en+l --+ eH (1)) to rule set R.
Then e E and e H are two frames of discernment repre senting th� anteced�nt frame and the conclusion frame of R respectively. Now the heuristic rule set R is complete and an evi dential mapping from e E to en can be created. In fact the added part of a rule represents our ignorance. In other words, based on the current knowledge of a specific domain, we have no knowledge to identify any more ad-hoc relationships among elements of reasons and results.
Example 2: Suppose we have a rule set R which consists of a rule as follows:
Smoke alarm is ringing --There is a fire (o.g)·
Constructing eE = { ( smoke alarm is ringing), not ( smoke alarm is ringing)} , Sn ={( there is a fire), not(there is a fire) } based on corollary 4, and a new rule set R' based on corollary 5 and R' has:
R1: Smoke alarm is ringing ---There is a fire (O.!l)i
Smoke alarm is ringing --en (0.1).
Rz: Not (Smoke alarm is ringing) ----+ eH (I).
This rule set can be associated with an evidential map ping from 9& to eH. In particular, if eH is the same as e E then the corresponding evidential mapping rep resents self-relations of 9& (it is also called delta-9& compatibility relation by Lowrance et al (1986) Bayesian inference produces will notcall 0.3 1.0 In the condition of prior probabili ties P(sl = on) = 0.2682, P(s2 = off) = 0.7314, applying formufa (2) we get a mass function on D which is the same as that showed in formula (4). In Bayesian multi-valued causal link models, the causal link between the hypothesis space H and the ev idence space E is identified by a nx m matrix M, where n and m are the numbers of values of H and E respec tively, and the (i, i) -th entry of M isM.: ; = P(e,-I h,) (Pearl 1988) .
It is easy to see (corollary 3) that the causal link model above is consistent with the special case of evidential mappings. The mass function on D obtained from formula (2) is exactly the same as the probability dis tribution on D obtained in Bayesian inference. Here we should make it clear that Pearl assumes that for each piece of evidence e" there exists an el· ement e3 in E where p(e3) = 1 given by e" so that P(e" I h.) = P(ei I � ). Can these posterior probabilities be calculated in D·S theory using evidential mappings based on the above causal link matrix under these assumptions? The following theorem indicates that they can.
3.2
CALCULATING POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES IN D-S THEORY
Theorem 1 1 .Ld E and H be two frames of discern ment, r• be a Bayesian evidential mapping from H to E, BM be the basic matrix of the mapping r• with (i ,:i)-th entry as p(e i I hi). Assume the prior proba bility on h, of H is p(h,), a set of evidence on E is e1, e 2 , ... ,e N for each of which. there exist! an e1 where p(e1) = 1. Then the final belief function Bel on H using D-S theory is
n where a= (�) p(h ,)[IIf= 1 p(e " I h ,) ] )) -1 1 and p(e " I h.) = p(e1 I h,) for each k when the evidence e k makes p(e1) = 1.
CONSTRUCTING COMPLETE EVIDENTIAL MA PPING MATRICES TO PROPAGATE
MA SS FUNCTIONS FROM AN EVIDENCE SPACE eE TO A HYPOTHESIS SPACE 9n
In Dempster-Shafer theory a miltivalued mapping is used to calculate a mass function on a frame based on either a probability distribution or a mass function on another frame (Lowrance et al 1986 , Zarley 1988 , Laskey et al 1989 . What we have assumed in the pre vious two sections is that a piece of evidence on an evidence space (a frame of discernment 9 E) is repre sented in the form of Bayesian subjective probabilities.
A mass function on e H will be obtained based on the probability distribution on 9E through an evidential mapping from 9 E to 9 H.
In section 2, we gave the definition of evidential map pings. Let e E and e H be two frames of discernment, r· be an evidential mapping from e E to e H. As suming a piece of evidence indicates that m(E) = p, m(9E) = 1-p, E is a subset of eE, what is the impact of the evidence on eH? Obviously the impact of the evidence on 9 H is easy to be got if f* is a mul tivalued mapping. But it is not so easy when r• is an evidential mapping.
1The proof of this theorem and other theorem, exam ples, and further discussion about evidential mappings and related work are given in the full version of the paper which is available on request (Liu et al1992) .
In this section, we introduce the approach to con structing complete evidential mapping matrices be tween two frames. A complete evidential mapping ma trix between two frames allows the propagation of a mass function from one frame to another.
Definition 3 Iff* is an evidential mapping from eE to e HI BM is the basic matrix of r· with J'Tii i as its {i ,i}-th entry, the titles of rows of BM are {e1}1 ••• 1 {en} � eE, the titles of columns of BM are A11 ••• 1 Am � eH I then a matrix is called a complete eviden tial mapping matrix of BM, denoted as CEM, if it is defined as: Obviously we have the unequal formula max(mhi,ml 2i···• ml�oi) � (ml1i+m!2i+ .. • +ml��;i)/ k � min(m l l i, m1 2i , . . . , ml ��: i)
The basic idea of constructing a complete eviden tial mapping matrix is that if the causal links from e l l , e12 .. . , el k to A' are m1li, m121· ... , ml�oi respectively, then the causal link from {eu, e12, ... , e11c} to A' is something between max(m1131 m123, . .. , ml�oi) and min(m11;, m1231 •• • , ml�oJl Here we use the average value of m11J", ml2 j 1 ••• , m1u· to represent approximate causal link from tell, e1 2 ... ,elk} to A'.
It is easy to prove that a CEM is a basic matrix of an evidential mapping from 29• to eH. So any piece of evidence, which is in the form of bpa on 9 E can be propagated to 9 H through the CEM. If a BM is the matrix of an multivalued mapping then its related CEM is also associated with the same multivalued mapping.
Certainly if a rule in a rule set specifies the causal link between a subset E of 9E and A1, ... ,An of 9H, then the values of row i, with the row title as E, are (f(E -+ A1), ... , f(E -+ An)) in CEM. But these f(E-+ A;) must satisfy the condition of ( 8) .
5
PROPAGATING BELIEFS USING HEURISTIC
KNOWLEDGE
Belief propagation in a rule based system as described above indicates that, given belief functions on an an tecedent frame and a set of rules with rule strengths in the form of mass functions, the belief functions on the conclusion frame can be deduced. H (R, 9s, 9n ), (R ', 9n, 9 k ), (R " , 9k, 9n), (R 11 9E , 9n ) and (R2, e E I e H) are five triples associated with five eviden tial mappings, generally we need to solve the following belief propagation problems:
(i). given a piece of evidence on eE, (R, eE, 9n) is known, to deduce belief on en.
(ii). given a piece of evidence on 9E, (R, ee, 9n ) , and ( R' I e HI en-) are known, to deduce belief on en-.
(iii). given two pieces of evidence on 9 E and 9E re spectively, (R, 9s, 9n) and {R", 9k, 9n ) are known, to deduce belief on 9 H.
(iv). given a piece of evidence on 9E, (R1, 9E, 9n ) and (R2, 9E, 9n ) are given independently, to deduce belief on en.
(v). given several pieces of evidence each of which is on A,B, ... , C respectively, (R, 9E, 9n) is known where 9E=A X Bx ... xc, to deduce belief on en.
These problems can be solved by the following three theorems.
Theorem 2 Let {R J e E J en) be a triple as.wciated with an evidential mapping r•, BM and GEM are the basic matrix and the complete evidential mapping ma· triz of r• 1 if a mass function m on 9 E is known, then a mas.! function m1 on 9H is calculated by the formula Specifically, if m is a Bayesian subjective probability assignment then m1 on 9 H is calculated by
Theorem S Let {R, 9E, 9n} and {R' , 9n, en) be two triples associated with two evidential mappings r· and r'*, CEM1 and CEM2 are two complete evidential mapping matriCeS of r* and r'* 1 if a maSS function m on 9 E is known, then a mass function m1 on 6u is calculated by the formula
where CEM=CEM1 x CEM2.
Theorem 3 indicates that if we know a series of evi dential mappings from 9E1 to 9E., ... , from 9s,._1 to e E,. and those CEM; of evidential mappings from 9E; to 9Ei+l fori = 1, ... ,n-1, then we will get an evidential mapping from eE. to eE .. with its CEM as CEM1x ... xCEM n-l· Theorems 2 and 3 can be used to solve problems (i) and (ii). Dempster's combination rule is used to deal with the problem in (iii) where we suppose that any two pieces of evidence bearing on the same frame are DS�independent (Voorbraak1991). DS�independence will guarantee that if we use Dempster's rule to com bine two probability distributions we should obtain the same result as what we get from Bayesian theory.
Theorem 4. Let {Rl,eE,eH) and {R2,eE, en) be two triples associated with two evidential mappings r· and r'* 1 m; and m� are two mass function.! indicating cau.!al links from e, to en in r· and r·· respectively (for i = 1, ... , n), that is r* (e,) = {(H,1, f( e, -+ Hil)), ... , (H;n•1 f(ei-+ Hin•))} m ; (A;,) == f(e,-+ H ;,) where A., = {(x, y )l x E ..,{ e.} or y E H,,} for l = 1,
and r '*(ei) = {( HI11 f(e,-+ Hid), ... , (HJ"H' f(ei-+ Hfn•)) } m H A �r) = /( e i -+ H �r} where A�r = {(x,y)lx E ..,{e,} or y E H!r } for r = 1,
then the joint impact of two evidential mappings is the third evidential mapping r" • from 9 E to 9 H in which: r "*{ei) = {{H" n, f( e i -+ H" n)}, ... , (H" ik1 f ( e , -+ H",�c))} {10} m;( A " ii) = f ( e • -+ H" ,,.) = m; e mHA" •.;) for i = 1, ... ,k where A" ij = Au n A�r• and H" i j =H., n HI,.· Here e indicates that Dempster's rule is used to com bine m; and m! .
The meaning of this theorem is that if there are two independent heuristic rule sets (as in fi gure 1) given by different domain experts respectively, each of those specifies one kind of causal link from frame e E to frame 9y, then the joint impact of the two causal links can be substituted by the third heuristic rule set which is produced from them. Here we need to address the issue that the meaning of this theorem is different from using theorem 2 twice through two evidential mappings. Using theorem 2 in that way gives a wrong result because of the depen dency of two mass functions On e H. 
2) given a series of pieces of evidence on A, B, . .. , C, based on those evidential mappings, geting a number of mass functions on the joint frame from each simple frame.
3) suppose A, B, ... , C are different from each other and the pieces of evidence are independent, using Dempster's combination rule to get the final mass function on 9 E. 4) so based on this final mass function on 9 E and an evidential mapping associated with (R, S,e, SH ) , ap plying theorem 2 eventually to deduce a mass function on 9H. where A= {(x,y)lzE-,E or yEH} Obviously Ginsberg's representation can be incorpo rated into an evidential mapping from 8 E to 8 H by the rule set R below.
R: E-+ H (c)i E---+ -.H (a)i E---+ S y <1-.t-cJ.
-. E ---+ 9 y (ll .
Hau and Kashyap's first explanation can also be incor porated into an evidential mapping from 9 E to 9 H by the rule set R'
In fact the second explanation given by Hau and Kashyap is to construct a mass function (furthermore a belief function) on a joint frame of discernment. Sim ilar explanations of a. rule are adopted by Laskey and Lehner (1989) , by Lowrance et al (1986) , and by Zarley et al (1988) . This is also consistent with our explana tion in section 2.2.
In section 5 we only discuss one situation involving the dependency problem. Hau and Kashyap (1990) can also be carri ed out by D-S theory under eviden tial mappings; 5). evidential mappings are consistent with other previous research work in this respect; 6). a series of belief propagation procedures are easily de duced based on evidential mappings.
Heuristic knowledge is important in knowledge based systems. Representing this kind of knowledge and propagating beliefs are the main and the most diffi cult tasks for designers of knowledge based systems. This paper makes some progress in this are a. Future work concerning evidential mappings in the Dempster Shaler theory should fo cus on exploring more fe atures of evidential mappings and more approaches to dealing with dependency relations.
